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Quantum key distribution (QKD) has initially been
proven secure using ideal devices. However, implementa-
tions use imperfect devices available with current technol-
ogy. Therefore, there are security proofs for QKD which
model the devices to allow these imperfection, though
at the expense of a lower secure key rate. To achieve
provable security, it is crucial that the devices and im-
plementations are verified to be within the models in the
security proofs.
Security loopholes have been found originating from
discrepancies between the actual implementations and
the models in the security proofs. For instance, one such
discrepancy allows the tailored bright illumination at-
tacks [1–3], recently shown also to be applicable against
superconducting single-photon detectors [4, 5]. In this
case the loophole is caused by the response of qubit mea-
surement devices (detectors) to swarms of qubits (bright
illumination). The question is how to counter such loop-
holes.
In their paper, Yuan et al. propose to counter these
bright illumination attacks by monitoring the avalanche
photodiode (APD) current for “anomalously high values”
[6]. The robustness of this countermeasure is shown by
arguing that previously proposed attacks do not work
anymore. First of all, this leaves the challenge of deter-
mining what is “anomalously high”. In order to achieve
provable security, this threshold must originate from a
security proof. Secondly, the fundamental issue, namely
that the detector response deviates from the models in
the security proofs [7], is not solved by this countermea-
sure.
As discussed previously [8, 9], practical QKD can-
not become provably secure by intuitive countermeasures
against known attacks. This approach also requires man-
ufacturers to make frequent, possibly costly upgrades to
their systems. Loopholes should instead be countered by
modifying the implementation and/or the security proofs
such that the devices are within the models of the security
proofs. This is the only way practical QKD can obtain
the provable security that makes it superior to classi-
cal key distribution schemes. This is also how loopholes
have been handled previously: for example, the photon-
number splitting attack [10] led to more general secu-
rity proofs [11] and eventually more efficient protocols
to negate the decrease in the key rate [12]. In another
example, detector efficiency mismatch [13], enabling for
instance the time-shift attack [14, 15], is now included in
security proofs [16, 17]. For the bright illumination at-
tacks, we have proposed a secure detection scheme which
integrates with security proofs [18]. In this scheme, a
calibrated light source is used to verify the quantum ef-
ficiency in the center of the detector gate. Randomizing
detection events outside the center of the gate provides
a lower bound on the fraction of detections in the center
of the gate.
In this particular case, we have already shown that
an eavesdropper using temporally tailored light of short
pulses containing less than 120 photons can threaten the
security of QKD [4]. This faint after-gate attack would
not be detectable with the countermeasure proposed by
Yuan et al., since the pulses would not cause an “anoma-
lously high” current, but rather a current similar to the
current caused by a single photon. Therefore, this serves
as an example of the risk associated with closing loop-
holes in an intuitive way.
[1] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Nat. Photonics 4, 686 (2010).
[2] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Opt. Express 18, 27938
(2010).
[3] C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs,
New J. Phys. 13, 013043 (2011).
[4] L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy,
∗ lars.lydersen@iet.ntnu.no
J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs,
arXiv:1106.2119 [quant-ph].
[5] L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar,
and V. Makarov, arXiv:1106.2396 [quant-ph].
[6] Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys.
Lett. 98, 231104 (2011).
[7] There are security proofs including this detector response
in their model of the receiver (for instance Ref. [17]), but
they predict zero secret key rate for such receivers.
[8] Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, Nat. Pho-
tonics 4, 800 (2010).
[9] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Nat. Photonics 4, 801 (2010).
2[10] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330 (2000).
[11] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and J. Preskill,
Quant. Inf. Comp. 4, 325 (2004).
[12] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[13] V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A
74, 022313 (2006); Erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008).
[14] B. Qi, C.-H. F. Fung, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, Quant. Inf.
Comp. 7, 73 (2007).
[15] Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo,
Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333 (2008).
[16] C.-H. F. Fung, K. Tamaki, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma,
Quant. Inf. Comp. 9, 131 (2009).
[17] Ø. Marøy, L. Lydersen, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A 82,
032337 (2010).
[18] L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A
83, 032306 (2011).
